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I. INTRODUCTION: THE LEGAL PROBLEM
Can thinking machines be subject to criminal law? In 1981, a 37-
year-old Japanese employee of a motorcycle factory was killed by an
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artificial-intelligence robot working near him.' The robot erroneously
identified the employee as a threat to its mission, and calculated that the
most efficient way to eliminate this threat was by pushing him into an
adjacent operating machine.2 Using its very powerful hydraulic arm, the
robot smashed the surprised worker into the operating machine, killing
him instantly, 3 and then resumed its duties with no one to interfere with
its mission. Unfortunately, this is not science fiction, and the legal
question is: Who is to be held liable for this cold-blooded, premeditated
murder?
The technological world is changing rapidly.4  Robots and
computers are replacing more and more simple human activities.' As
long as humanity used computers as mere tools, there was no real
difference between computers and screwdrivers, cars, or telephones.
When computers became sophisticated, we used to say that computers
"think" for us. The problem began when computers evolved from
"thinking" machines (machines that were programmed to perform
defined thought processes/computing) into thinking machines (without
quotation marks), or Artificial Intelligence (AL). Al is the capability of a
machine to imitate intelligent behavior.6 Al is the simulation of human
behavior and cognitive processes on a computer and hence is the study
of the nature of the whole space of intelligent minds.7 Al research began
in the 1940s and early 1950s.8 Since then, Al entities have become an
integral part of modem human life, functioning much more
sophisticatedly than other daily tools.9 Could they become dangerous?
In fact, they already are, as the above incident attests. In 1950,
Isaac Asimov set down three fundamental laws of robotics in his science
fiction masterpiece L Robot. (1) A robot may not injure a human being
1. The facts above are based on the overview in Yueh-Hsuan Weng, Chien-Hsun Chen &
Chuen-Tsai Sun, Toward the Human-Robot Co-Existence Society:On Safety Intelligence for Next
Generation Robots, 1 INT. J. Soc. ROBOT 267, 273 (2009).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 267; Isabelle Boucq, Robots for Business, http://www.Atelier-us.com/emerging-
technologies/article/robots-for-business (last visited May 18, 2010).
5. Boucq, supra note 4.
6. N.P. PADHY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS 3 (Oxford University
Press 2005).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 4-5.
9. Chris Capps, "Thinking" Supercomputer Now Conscious as a Cat,
http://www.unexplainable.net/artman/publish/article_14423.shtml (last visited May 19, 2010);
Boucq, supra note 4.
[4:171
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or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm;' 0 (2) A robot
must obey the orders given it by human beings, except where such
orders would conflict with the First Law;" (3) A robot must protect its
own existence, as long as such protection does not conflict with the First
or Second Laws.
12
These three fundamental laws are obviously contradictory. 3 What
if a man orders a robot to hurt another person for the own good of the
other person? What if the robot is in police service and the commander
of the mission orders it to arrest a suspect and the suspect resists arrest?
Or what if the robot is in medical service and is ordered to perform a
surgical procedure on a patient, the patient objects, but the medical
doctor insists that the procedure is for the patient's own good, and
repeats the order to the robot? Besides, Asimov's fundamental laws of
robotics relate only to robots.14 A robot without Al software would not
be subject to Asimov's laws, even if these laws had any real legal
significance.' 5
The main question in that context is, what kind of laws or ethics are
correct, and who is to decide? In order to cope with these same
problems as they relate to humans, society devised criminal law.'
6
Criminal law embodies the most powerful legal social control in modem
civilization.' 7 People's fear of Al entities, in most cases, is based on the
fact that Al entities are not considered to be subject to the law, 8
specifically to criminal law.' 9 In the past, people were similarly fearful
10. ISAAC AsIMov, 1, ROBOT 40 (Doubleday 1950) [hereinafter ASIMOV, I, ROBOT].
11. Id.
12. Id..
13. Isaac Asimov himself wrote in his introduction to The Rest of Robots that "[t]here was just
enough ambiguity in the Three Laws to provide the conflicts and uncertainties required for new
stories, and, to my great relief, it seemed always to be possible to think up a new angle out of the
sixty-one words of the Three Laws." ISSAC ASIMOV, THE REST OF ROBOTS 43 (Doubleday 1964).
14. See ASiMOv, 1, ROBOT, supra note 10, at 40 (1950).
15. Id.
16. WILLIAM M. CLARK & WILLIAM L. MARSHALL, LAW OF CRIMES 1-2 (7th ed., 1967)
("Human control on social behavior is the purpose of criminal law."). See Davida A. Williams,
Note, Punishing the Faithfid: Freud, Religion, and the Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REv. 2181 (citing
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 22 (2d ed. 1986) (noting that the
basic purpose of criminal law is to make people do what society desires and not do what society
deems improper)). Criminal law is aimed at preventing people from doing the undesirable and,
thus, the enforcement of criminal laws through punishment should be deemed a necessity. See id.
17. Id.
18. Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhoodfor Artificial Intelligences. 70 N.C. L. REv. 1231
(1992).
19. The apprehension that Al entities evoke may have arisen due to Hollywood's depiction of
Al entities in numerous films, such as 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1968), and
the modem trilogy, The Matrix, in which Al entities are not subject to the law. THE MATRIX
20101
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of corporations and their power to commit a spectrum of crimes, 20 but
because corporations are legal entities subject to criminal and corporate
law, that kind of fear has been significantly reduced.2'
Therefore, the modem question relating to Al entities becomes:
Does the growing intelligence of Al entities subject them to legal social
control as any other legal entity?22 This article attempts to work out a
legal solution to the problem of the criminal liability of Al entities. At
the outset, a definition of an Al entity will be presented. Based on that
definition, this article will then propose and introduce three models of Al
entity criminal liability:
23
(1) The Perpetration-via-Another Liability Model
(2) The Natural-Probable-Consequence Liability Model
(3) The Direct Liability Model.
These three models might be applied separately, but in many
situations, a coordinated combination of them (all or some of them) is
required in order to complete the legal structure of criminal liability.24
Once we examine the possibility of legally imposing criminal liability on
Al entities, then the question of punishment must be addressed. How
can an Al entity serve a sentence of incarceration? How can capital
punishment be imposed on an Al entity? How can probation, a
pecuniary fine, etc. be imposed on an Al entity? Consequently, it is
(Warner Bros. Pictures 1999); THE MATRIX RELOADED (Warner Bros. Pictures 2003); THE MATRIX
REVOLUTIONS (Warner Bros. Pictures 2003). However, it should be noted that Hollywood did treat
A] entities in an empathic way as well, by depicting them as human, as almost human, or as wishing
to be human. See, e.g., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A.I. (Warner Bros. Pictures 2001). This kind of
treatment included, of course, clear subordination to human legal social control, and to criminal law.
20. John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalised Inquiry into
the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1981).
21. Id; STEVEN Box, POWER, CRIME AND MYSTIFICATION 16-79 (1983); Brent Fisse & John
Braithwaite, The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: Individualism, Collectivism and
Accountability, 11 SYDNEY L. REV. 468, 474-510 (1988).
22. See in general, but not in relation to criminal law, e.g., Thorne L. McCarty, Reflections on
Taxman: An Experiment in Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 90 HARV. L. REV. 837
(1977); Donald E. Elliott, Holmes and Evolution: Legal Process as Artificial Intelligence, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 113 (1984); Thomas E. Headrick & Bruce G. Buchanan, Some Speculation about
Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 23 STAN. L. REV. 40 (1971); Antonio A. Martino,
Artificial Intelligence and Law, 2 INT'L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 154 (1994); Edwina L. Rissland,
Artificial Intelligence and Law: Stepping Stones to a Model of Legal Reasoning, 99 YALE L.J. 1957
(1990).
23. The Perpetration-by-Another Liability Model is discussed hereinafter at Part II.B. The
Natural Probable Consequence Liability Model is discussed hereinafter at Part III.C. The Direct
Liability Model is discussed hereinafter at Part III.D.
24. The coordination of the three liability models is discussed hereinafter at Part lIl.E.
(4:171
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necessary to formulate viable forms of punishment in order to impose
criminal liability practically on Al entities.
II. WHAT IS AN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ENTITY? - MACHINA SAPIENS
- A "THINKING" MACHINE OR A THINKING MACHINE
For some years, there has been significant controversy about the
very essence of an Al entity.26 Futurologists have proclaimed the birth
of a new species, machina sapiens, which will share the human place as
intelligent creatures on earth.27 Critics have argued that a "thinking
machine" is an oxymoron.28 Machines, including computers, with their
foundations of cold logic, can never be insightful or creative as
humans. 29 This controversy raises the basic questions of the essence of
humanity (Do human beings function as thinking machines?) and of Al
(Can there be thinking machines?).3 °
There are five attributes that one would expect an intelligent entity
to have.3 1 The first is communication.32 One can communicate with an
intelligent entity.3 The easier it is to communicate with an entity, the
more intelligent the entity seems.3" One can communicate with a dog,
but not about Einstein's Theory of Relativity. 35 One can communicate
with a little child about Einstein's theory, but it requires a discussion in
terms that a child can comprehend.36  The second is internal
25. The general punishment adjustment considerations are discussed hereinafter at Part IV.
26. See, e.g., Terry Winograd, Thinking Machines: Can There Be? Are We?, THE
FOUNDATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 167 (Derek Partridge & Yorick Wilks eds., 2006).
27. The information is integrated and creates a full image of sensory information, perception,
dynamic action and reaction, and cognition. B.G. FITCH ET AL., IBM RESEARCH REPORT, BLUE
MATTER: AN APPLICATION FRAMEWORK FOR MOLECULAR SIMULATION ON BLUE GENE (2003),
http://leitl.org/docs/nano/bluematter.pdf. This platform simulates brain capabilities, and eventually,
it is supposed to simulate real thought processes. Id. The final application of this algorithm contains
not only analog and digital circuits, metal or plastics, but also protein-based biologic surfaces. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. For the formal foundations of Al, see, e.g., Teodor C. Przymusinski, Non-Monotonic
Reasoning Versus Logic Programming: A New Perspective, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE 49 (Derek Partridge & Yorick Wilks eds., 2006); Richard W. Weyhrauch,
Prolegomena to a Theory of Mechanized Formal Reasoning, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE 72 (Derek Partridge & Yorick Wilks eds., 2006).
31. Roger C. Schank, What Is A4 Anyway?, Al MAG., Winter 1987, at 59.




36. Schank, supra note 31.
2010]
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knowledge. 37 An intelligent entity is expected to have some knowledge
about itself.
The third is external knowledge.38 An intelligent entity is expected
to know about the outside world, to learn about it, and utilize that
information.39  The fourth is goal-driven behavior.4 °  An intelligent
entity is expected to take action in order to achieve its goals. The fifth is
creativity. 41 An intelligent entity is expected to have some degree of
creativity.42 In this context, creativity means the ability to take alternate
action when the initial action fails.43 A fly tries to exit a room and
bumps into a windowpane continues to repeat the same futile behavior.
When an Al robot bumps into a window, it tries to exit using the door.
Most Al entities possess these five attributes by definition. 44  Some
twenty-first century types of Al entities possess even more attributes that
45enable them to act in far more sophisticated ways.
An Al entity has a wide variety of applications, including in
robots.46 A robot can be designed to imitate the physical capabilities of
a human being, and these capabilities can be improved.47 A robot is
capable of being physically faster and stronger than a human being.48
The Al software installed in it also enables the robot to calculate many
complicated calculations faster and simultaneously, or to "think"
faster.49 An Al entity is capable of learning and of gaining experience,
and experience is a useful way of learning.50 All these attributes create
37. Id.
38. Id. at 60.
39. Id.
40. Id
41. Schank, supra note 31, at 60.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 60-62.
45. In November 2009, during the Supercomputing Conference in Portland Oregon (SC 09),
IMB scientists and others announced that they succeeded in creating a new algorithm named "Blue
Matter," which possesses the thinking capabilities of a cat Capps, supra note 9; International
Conference for High Performance Computing, Networking, Storage and Analysis, SC09,
http://sc09.supercomputing.org/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2010). This algorithm collects information
from very many units with parallel and distributed connections. The information is integrated and
creates a full image of sensory information, perception, dynamic action and reaction, and cognition.
FITCH, supra note 27. This platform simulates brain capabilities, and eventually, it is supposed to
simulate real thought processes. Id. The final application of this algorithm contains not only analog
and digital circuits, metal or plastics, but also protein-based biologic surfaces. Id.
46. PADHY, supra note 6, at v.
47. Id. at 7-8
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the essence of an Al entity." AI robots and Al software are used in a
wide range of applications in industry, military services, medical
services, science, and even in games.52
III. THREE MODELS OF THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ENTITIES
A. The Relevant General Requirements for the Imposition
of Criminal Liability
The basic question of criminal law is the question of criminal
liability; i.e., whether the specific entity (human or corporation) bears
criminal liability for a specific offense committed at a specific point in
time and space. In order to impose criminal liability upon a person,
two main elements must exist.54  The first is the external or factual
element-i.e., criminal conduct (actus reus)--while the other is the
internal or mental element-i.e., knowledge or general intent vis-A-vis
the conduct element (mens rea).55 If one element is missing, no criminal
liability can be imposed.56
The actus reus requirement is expressed mainly by acts or
omissions. 7 Sometimes, other external elements are required in addition
to conduct, such as the specific results of that conduct and the specific
circumstances underlying the conduct.58 The mens rea requirement has
51. See, e.g., Yorick Wilks, One Small Head: Models and Theories, THE FOUNDATIONS OF
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 121 (Derek Partridge & Yorick Wilks eds., 2006); Alan Bundy & Stellan
Ohisson, The Nature of AI Principles, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 135 (Derek
Partridge & Yorick Wilks eds., 2006); Thomas W. Simon, Artificial Methodology Meets
Philosophy, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 155 (Derek Partridge & Yorick
Wilks eds., 2006).
52. See, e.g., William B. Schwartz, Ramesh S. Patil & Peter Szolovits, Artificial Intelligence
in Medicine: Where Do We Stand?, 27 JURIMETRICS J. 362 (1987); Richard E. Susskind, Artificial
Intelligence, Expert Systems and the Law, 5 DENNING L.J. 105 (1990).
53. See CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 16, at 23.
54. JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 126 (2007).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Walter Harrison Hitchler, The Physical Element of Crime, 39 DICK. L. REV. 95 (1934);
MICHAEL MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
CRIMINAL LAW 156-68 (1993).
58. JOHN WILLIAM SALMOND, ON JURISPRUDENCE 505 (Glanville Williams ed., 1 1th ed.
1957); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 11 (2d ed. 1961); OLIVER W.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 54 (1923); Walter Wheeler Cook, Act, Intention, and Motive in
Criminal Law, 26 YALE L.J. 645 (1917).
2010]
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various levels of mental elements.59 The highest level is expressed by
knowledge, 60 while sometimes it is accompanied by a requirement of
intent or specific intention.61 Lower levels are expressed by negligence
62
(a reasonable person should have known) or by strict liability offenses.63
No other criteria or capabilities are required in order to impose
criminal liability, not from humans, nor from any other kind of entity,
including corporations and Al entities.64 An entity might possess further
capabilities, however, in order to impose criminal liability; the existence
of actus reus and mens rea in the specific offense is quite enough. 65 A
spider is capable of acting, but it is incapable of formulating the mens
rea requirement; therefore, a spider bite bears no criminal liability. A
parrot is capable of repeating words it hears, but it is incapable of
formulating the mens rea requirement for libel.
In order to impose criminal liability on any kind of entity, it must
be proven that the above two elements existed.66  When it has been
proven that a person committed the criminal act knowingly or with
criminal intent, that person is held criminally liable for that offense.67
The relevant question concerning the criminal liability of Al entities is:
How can Al entities fulfill the two requirements of criminal liability?
This paper proposes the imposition of criminal liability on Al entities
using three possible models of liability: the Perpetration-via-Another
liability model; the Natural-Probable-Consequence liability model; and
the Direct liability model. The following is an explanation of these three
possible models.
59. DRESSLER, supra note 54, at 980-81 (4th ed. 2007); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02.
60. Id; United States v. Youts, 229 F.3d 1312, 1316 (10th Cir. 2000).
61. J. LI. J. Edwards, The Criminal Degrees of Knowledge, 17 MOD. L. REV. 294 (1954);
Rollin M. Perkins, "Knowledge" as a Mens Rea Requirement, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 953 (1978);
United States v. Youts, 229 F.3d 1312, 1317 (10th Cir. 2000); State v. Sargent, 594 A.2d 401 (Vt.
1991); State v. Wyatt, 482 S.E.2d 147 (W. Va. 1996); People v. Steinberg, 595 N.E.2d 845 (N.Y.
1992).
62. Jerome Hall, Negligent Behaviour Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 COLUM.
L. REV. 632 (1963); Robert P. Fine & Gary M. Cohen, Is Criminal Negligence a Defensible Basis
for Criminal Liability?, 16 BuFF. L. REV. 749 (1966) DRESSLER, supra note 54, at 980-81; MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.02..
63. Jeremy Horder, Strict Liability, Statutory Construction and the Spirit of Liberty, 118 LAW
Q. REV. 458 (2002); Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1933);
Stuart P. Green, Six Senses of Strict Liability: A Plea for Formalism, APPRAISING STRICT
LIABILITY I (A. P. Simester ed., 2005); A. P. Simester, Is Strict Liability Always Wrong?,
APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY 21 (A. P. Simester ed., 2005).
64. DRESSLER, supra note 54, at 980-81; MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02.
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B. The Perpetration-via-Another Liability Model: Artificial
Intelligence Entities as Innocent Agents
This first model does not consider the Al entity as possessing any
human attributes. The Al entity is considered an innocent agent.68
Accordingly, due to that legal viewpoint, a machine is a machine, and is
never human. However, one cannot ignore an Al entity's capabilities, as
mentioned above. Pursuant to this model, these capabilities are
insufficient to deem the Al entity a perpetrator of an offense. These
capabilities resemble the parallel capabilities of a mentally limited
person, such as a child,6 9 a person who is mentally incompetent,7 ° or one
who lacks a criminal state of mind.7'
Legally, when an offense is committed by an innocent agent (a
child,72 a person who is mentally incompetent,73 or one who lacks a
criminal state of mind to commit an offense74) that person is criminally
liable as a perpetrator-via-another.75 In such cases, the intermediary is
regarded as a mere instrument, albeit a sophisticated instrument, while
the party orchestrating the offense (the perpetrator-via-another) is the
real perpetrator as a principal in the first degree and is held accountable
for the conduct of the innocent agent.
The perpetrator's liability is determined on the basis of the
"instrument's" conduct 76 and his mental state. 77 The derivative question
relative to artificial intelligence entities is: Who is the perpetrator-via-
another? There are two candidates: the first is the programmer of the Al
software and the second is the user, or the end-user. A programmer of
Al software might design a program in order to commit offenses via the
68. Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhoodfor Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231
(1992).
69. Maxey v. United States, 30 App. D.C. 63, 80 (App. D.C. 1907);
70. Johnson v. State, 142 Ala. 70, 71 (1904).
71. United States v. Bryan, 483 F.2d 88, 92 (3d Cir. 1973).
72. Maxey, 30 App. D.C. at 80 (App. D.C. 1907); Commonwealth v. Hill, 11 Mass. 136
(1814); Michael, (1840) 2 Mood. 120, 169 E.R. 48.
73. Johnson v. State, 38 So. 182, 183 (Ala. 1904); People v. Monks, 24 P.2d 508, 511 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1933).
74. United States v. Bryan, 483 F.2d 88, 92 (3d Cir. 1973); Boushea v. United States, 173
F.2d 131, 134 (8th Cir. 1949); People v. Mutchler, 140 N.E. 820, 823 (I11. 1923); State v. Runkles,
605 A.2d 111, 121 (Md. 1992); Parnell v. State, 912 S.W.2d 422,424 (Ark. 1996); State v. Thomas,
619 S.W.2d 513, 514 (Tenn. 1981).
75. Morrisey v. State, 620 A.2d 207, 210 (Del. 1993); Conyers v. State, 790 A.2d 15 (Md.
2002); Gallimore v. Commonwealth, 436 S.E.2d 421, 424 (Va. 1993).
76. Dusenbery v. Commonwealth, 772 263 S.E.2d 392 (Va. 1980).
77. United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092, 1101 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Ruffim, 613 F.2d 408, 411 (2d Cir. 1979).
2010]
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Al entity. For example: A programmer designs software for an
operating robot. The robot is intentionally placed in a factory, and its
software is designed to torch the factory at night when no one is there.
The robot committed the arson, but the programmer is deemed the
perpetrator.
The second person who might be considered the perpetrator-via-
another is the user of the Al entity. The user did not program the
software, but he uses the Al entity, including its software, for his own
benefit. For example, a user purchases a servant-robot, which is
designed to execute any order given by its master. The robot identifies
the specific user as the master, and the master orders the robot to assault
any invader of the house. The robot executes the order exactly as
ordered. This is not different than a person who orders his dog to attack
any trespasser. The robot committed the assault, but the user is deemed
the perpetrator.
In both scenarios, the actual offense was committed by the Al
entity. The programmer or the user did not perform any action
conforming to the definition of a specific offense; therefore, they do not
meet the actus reus requirement of the specific offense.78  The
perpetration-via-another liability model considers the action committed
by the Al entity as if it had been the programmer's or the user's action.
The legal basis for liability is the instrumental usage of the Al entity as
an innocent agent. 79 No mental attribute required for the imposition of
criminal liability is attributed to the Al entity.8 0 When programmers or
users use an Al entity instrumentally, the commission of an offense by
the Al entity is attributed to them. The internal element required in the
specific offense already exists in their minds. The programmer had
criminal intent when he ordered the commission of the arson, and the
user had criminal intent when he ordered the commission of the assault,
even though these offenses were actually committed through a robot, an
Al entity. When an end-user makes instrumental usage of an innocent
agent to commit a crime, the end-user is deemed the perpetrator.
This liability model does not attribute any mental capability, or any
human mental capability, to the Al entity. According to this model, there
is no legal difference between an Al entity and a screwdriver or an
78. See DRESSLER, supra note 54, at 126.
79. See Solum, supra note 69, at 1237.
80. The Al entity is used as an instrument and not as a participant, although it uses its features
of processing information. See, e.g., George R. Cross & Cary G. Debessonet, An Artificial
Intelligence Application in the Law: CCLIPS, A Computer Program that Processes Legal
Information, 1 HIGH TECH. L.J. 329 (1986).
[4:171180
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animal. When a burglar uses a screwdriver in order to open up a
window, he uses the screwdriver instrumentally, and the screwdriver is
not criminally liable. The screwdriver's "action" is, in fact, the
burglar's. This is the same legal situation when using an animal
instrumentally. An assault committed by a dog by order of its master is,
in fact, an assault committed by the master.
This kind of legal model might be suitable for two types of
scenarios. The first scenario is using an AI entity to commit an offense
without using its advanced capabilities. The second scenario is using a
very old version of an Al entity, which lacks the modem advanced
capabilities of the modem Al entities. In both scenarios, the use of the
Al entity is instrumental usage. Still, it is usage of an Al entity, due to
its ability to execute an order to commit an offense. A screwdriver
cannot execute such an order; a dog can. A dog cannot execute
complicated orders; an Al entity can.8 l
The perpetration-via-another liability model is not suitable when an
Al entity decides to commit an offense based on its own accumulated
experience or knowledge. This model is not suitable when the software
of the Al entity was not designed to commit the specific offense, but was
committed by the Al entity nonetheless. This model is also not suitable
when the specific Al entity functions not as an innocent agent, but as a
semi-innocent agent.82 However, the perpetration-via-another liability
model might be suitable when a programmer or user makes instrumental
usage of an Al entity, but without using the Al entity's advanced
capabilities. The legal result of applying this model is that the
programmer and the user are criminally liable for the specific offense
committed, while the Al entity has no criminal liability whatsoever.
83
C. The Natural-Probable-Consequence Liability Model: Foreseeable
Offenses Committed by Artificial Intelligence Entities
The second model of criminal liability assumes deep involvement
of the programmers or users in the Al entity's daily activities, but
without any intention of committing any offense via the Al entity. For
example, during the execution of its daily tasks, an Al entity commits an
81. Cf. Andrew J. Wu, From Video Games to Artificial Intelligence: Assigning Copyright
Ownership to Works Generated by Increasingly Sophisticated Computer Programs, 25 AIPLA Q.J.
131 (1997); Timothy L. Butler, Can a Computer Be an Author - Copyright Aspects of Artificial
Intelligence, 4 COMM. ENT. L.S. 707 (1982).
82. NICOLA LACEY AND CELIA WELLS, RECONSTRUCTING CRIMINAL LAW - CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL PROCESS 53 (2d ed. 1998).
83. People v. Monks, 133 Cal. App. 440,446 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1933).
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offense. The programmers or users had no knowledge of the offense
until it had already been committed; they did not plan to commit any
offense, and they did not participate in any part of the commission of
that specific offense.
One example of such a scenario is an Al robot, or software, which
is designed to function as an automatic pilot. The Al entity is
programmed to protect the mission as part of the mission of flying the
plane. During the flight, the human pilot activates the automatic pilot
(which is the Al entity), and the program is initialized. At some point
after activation of the automatic pilot, the human pilot sees an
approaching storm and tries to abort the mission and return to base. The
Al entity deems the human pilot's action as a threat to the mission and
takes action in order to eliminate that threat. It might cut off the air
supply to the pilot or activate the ejection seat, etc. As a result, the
human pilot is killed by the Al entity's actions.
Obviously, the programmer had not intended to kill anyone,
especially not the human pilot, but nonetheless, the human pilot was
killed as a result of the Al entity's actions, and these actions were done
according to the program. Another example is Al software designed to
detect threats from the Internet and protect a computer system from
these threats. A few days after the software is activated, it figures out
that the best way to detect such threats is by entering websites it defines
as dangerous and destroying any software recognized as a threat. When
the software does that, it is committing a computer offense, although the
programmer did not intend for the Al entity to do so.
In these examples, the first model is not legally suitable.84 The first
model assumes mens rea, the criminal intent of the programmers or
users to commit an offense via the instrumental use of some of the Al
entity's capabilities. 85 This is not the legal situation in these cases. In
these cases, the programmers or users had no knowledge of the
committed offense; they had not planned it, and had not intended to
commit the offense using the Al entity. For such cases, the second
model might create a suitable legal response. This model is based upon
the ability of the programmers or users to foresee the potential
commission of offenses.86
According to the second model, a person might be held accountable
for an offense, if that offense is a natural and probable consequence of
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that person's conduct.8 7 Originally, the natural-probable-consequence
liability model was used to impose criminal liability upon accomplices,
when one committed an offense, which had not been planned by all of
them and which was not part of a conspiracy.88 The established rule
prescribed by courts and commentators is that accomplice liability
extends to acts of a perpetrator that were a "natural and probable
consequence" 89 of a criminal scheme that the accomplice encouraged or
aided.90  Natural-probable-consequence liability has been widely
accepted in accomplice liability statutes and codifications. 91
Natural-probable-consequence liability seems legally suitable for
situations in which an Al entity committed an offense, while the
programmer or user had no knowledge of it, had not intended it, and had
not participated in it.92  The natural-probable-consequence liability
model requires the programmer or user to be in a negligent mental state,
93
not more. Programmers or users are not required to know about any
forthcoming commission of an offense as a result of their activity, but
are required to know that such an offense is a natural, probable
consequence of their actions. 94
A negligent person, in a criminal context, is a person who has no
knowledge of the offense, but a reasonable person should have known
about it since the specific offense is a natural probable consequence of
that person's conduct.95 The programmers or users of an Al entity, who
should have known about the probability of the forthcoming commission
of the specific offense, are criminally liable for the specific offense, even
though they did not actually know about it.96 This is the fundamental
87. See supra Part III.C.
88. Id.
89. United States v. Powell, 929 F.2d 724 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
90. CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 16, at 529 (7th ed. 1967); People v. Prettyman, 926 P.2d
1013 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Chance v. State, 685 A.2d 351, 354 (Del. 1996); Ingram v. United
States, 592 A.2d 992, 1006 (D.C. App. 1991); Richardson v. State, 697 N.E.2d 462, 465 (Ind.
1998); Mitchell v. State, 971 P.2d 813 (Nev. 1998); State v. Carrasco, 928 P.2d 939 (N.M. 1996);
State v. Jackson, 976 P.2d 1229 (Wash. 1999).
91. State v. Kaiser, 918 P.2d 629 (Kan. 1996); United States v. Andrews, 75 F.3d 552 (9th
Cir. 1996).
92. Andrews, 75 F.3d at 552.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Robert P. Fine & Gary M. Cohen, Is Criminal Negligence a Defensible Basis for Criminal
Liability?, 16 BUFF. L. REv. 749 (1966); Herbert L. A. Hart, Negligence, Mens Rea and Criminal
Responsibility, OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 29 (1961); Donald Stuart, Mens Rea,
Negligence and Attempts, 1968 CRIM. L. REV. 647 (1968).
96. Kaiser, 260 Kan. at 245.
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legal basis for criminal liability in negligence cases.97 Negligence is, in
fact, an omission of awareness or knowledge.98 The negligent person
omitted knowledge, not acts. 99
The natural-probable-consequence liability model would permit
predicating liability upon negligence, even when the specific offense
requires a different state of mind.'00 This is not valid in relation to the
person who personally committed the offense, but rather, is considered
valid in relation to the person who was not the actual perpetrator of the
offense, but was one of its intellectual perpetrators.'10  Reasonable
programmers or users should have foreseen the offense, and prevented it
from being committed by the Al entity.
However, the legal results of applying the natural-probable-
consequence liability model to the programmer or user differ in two
different types of factual cases. The first type of case is when the
programmers or users were negligent while programming or using the
Al entity but had no criminal intent to commit any offense. The second
type of case is when the programmers or users programmed or used the
Al entity knowingly and willfully in order to commit one offense via the
Al entity, but the Al entity deviated from the plan and committed some
other offense, in addition to or instead of the planned offense.
The first type of case is one of pure negligence.' 0 2  The
programmers or users negligently acted or failed to act; therefore, there
is no reason why they should not be held accountable for an offense of
negligence, if there is such an offense in the specific legal system. Thus,
as in the above example, where a programmer of an automatic pilot
negligently programmed it to defend its mission with no restrictions on
the taking of human life, the programmer is negligent and liable for the
homicide of the human pilot. Consequently, if there is a specific offense
of negligent homicide in that legal system, this is the most severe
offense for which the programmer might be held accountable, not
manslaughter or murder, which requires knowledge or intent.
10 3
97. DRESSLER, supra note 54, at 980-81; MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE - OFFICIAL DRAFT AND
EXPLANATORY NOTES 312 (1962, 1985); State v. Linscott, 520 A.2d 1067, 1070 (Me. 1987).
101. Kaiser, 260 Kan. at245.
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The second type of case resembles the basic idea of the natural-
probable-consequence liability in accomplice liability cases. 1°4 The
dangerousness of the very association or conspiracy whose aim is to
commit an offense is the legal reason for imposing more severe
accountability upon the cohorts. For example, a programmer programs
an Al entity to commit a violent robbery in a bank, but the programmer
did not program the Al entity to kill anyone. During the execution of the
robbery, the Al entity kills one of the people present at the bank who
resisted the robbery. In such cases, the criminal negligence liability
alone is insufficient. The danger posed by such a situation far exceeds
negligence.
As a result, according to the natural-probable-consequence liability
model, when the programmers or users programmed or used the Al
entity knowingly and willfully in order to commit one offense via the Al
entity, but the Al entity deviated from the plan and committed another
offense, in addition to or instead of the planned offense, the
programmers or users shall be held accountable for the offense itself, as
if it had been committed knowingly and willfully.'0 5 In the above
example of the robbery, the programmer shall be held criminally
accountable for the robbery (if committed), as well as for the killing, as
an offense of manslaughter or murder, which requires knowledge and
intent. 106
The question still remains: What is the criminal liability of the Al
entity itself when the natural-probable-consequence liability model is
applied? In fact, there are two possible outcomes. If the Al entity acted
as an innocent agent, without knowing anything about the criminal
prohibition, it is not held criminally accountable for the offense it
committed. 10 7 Under such circumstances, the actions of the Al entity
were not different from the actions of the Al entity under the first model
(the perpetration-via-another liability model).0 8 However, if the Al
entity did not act merely as an innocent agent, then, in addition to the
criminal liability of the programmer or user pursuant to the natural-
104. State v. Kaiser, 260 Kan. 235, 245 (1996); United States v. Andrews, 75 F.3d 552, 556
(9th Cir. 1996).
105. Id.
106. Regina v. Cunningham, [1957] 2 Q.B. 396, [1957] 2 All E.R. 412, [1957] 3 W.L.R. 76,41
Cr. App. Rep. 155; Faulkner, (1876) 13 Cox C.C. 550, 556; United States v. Greer, 467 F.2d 1064,
1069 (7th Cir. 1972); People v. Cooper, 743 N.E.2d 32, 36 (111. 2000); People v. Weiss, 9 N.Y.S.2d
1 (1939); People v. Little, 107 P.2d 634, 639 (Cal Dist. Ct. App. 1941); People v. Cabaltero, 87 P.2d
364, 369 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939); People v. Michalow, 128 N.E. 228, 229-30 (N.Y. 1920).
107. See supra Part III.B.
108. See subparagraph II1.B.
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probable-consequence liability model, the Al entity itself shall be held
criminally liable for the specific offense directly.0 9 The direct liability
model of Al entities is the third model, as described hereunder.
D. The Direct Liability Model: Artificial Intelligence Entities as being
Tantamount to Human Offenders
The third model does not assume any dependence of the Al entity
on a specific programmer or user. The third model focuses on the Al
entity itself."0 As discussed above, criminal liability for a specific
offense is mainly comprised of the external element (actus reus) and the
internal element (mens rea) of that offense."' Any person attributed
with both elements of the specific offense is held criminally accountable
for that specific offense." 2 No other criteria are required in order to
impose criminal liability. 13 A person might possess further capabilities,
but, in order to impose criminal liability, the existence of the external
element and the internal element required to impose liability for the
specific offense is quite enough. 14
In order to impose criminal liability on any kind of entity, the
existence of these elements in the specific entity must be proven." 5
When it has been proven that a person committed the offense in question
with knowledge or intent, that person is held criminally liable for that
offense. 16 The relevant questions regarding the criminal liability of Al
entities are: How can these entities fulfill the requirements of criminal
liability? Do Al entities differ from humans in this context?
An Al algorithm might have many features and qualifications that
exceed those of an average human, but such features or qualifications are
not required in order to impose criminal liability. 1 7 When a human or
corporation fulfills the requirements of both the external element and the
109. State v. Kaiser, 918 P.2d 629, 637 (Kan. 1996); United States v. Andrews, 75 F.3d 552,
556 (9th Cir. 1996).
110. Cf e.g., Steven J. Frank, Tort Adjudication and the Emergence of Artificial Intelligence
Software, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 623 (1987); S. N. Lehmanqzig, Frankenstein Unbound- Towards
a Legal Definition of Artificial Intelligence, 1981 FUTURES 442 (1981); Maruerite E. Gerstner,
Liability Issues with Artificial Intelligence Software, 33 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 239 (1993); Richard
E. Susskind, Expert Systems in Law: A Jurisprudential Approach to Artificial Intelligence and Legal
Reasoning, 49 MOD. L. REV. 168 (1986).
111. See supra Part III.A.
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internal element, criminal liability is imposed. 18 If an Al entity is
capable of fulfilling the requirements of both the external element and
the internal element, and, in fact, it actually fulfills them, there is nothing
to prevent criminal liability from being imposed on that Al entity." 9
Generally, the fulfillment of the external element requirement of an
offense is easily attributed to Al entities. 120 As long as an Al entity
controls a mechanical or other mechanism to move its moving parts, any
act might be considered as performed by the Al entity.121 Thus, when an
Al robot activates its electric or hydraulic arm and moves it, this might
be considered an act, if the specific offense involves such an act. For
example, in the specific offense of assault, such an electric or hydraulic
movement of an Al robot that hits a person standing nearby is
considered as fulfilling the actus reus requirement of the offense of
assault. 1
22
When an offense might be committed due to an omission, it is even
simpler. Under this scenario, the Al entity is not required to act at all.
123
Its very inaction is the legal basis for criminal liability, as long as there
had been a duty to act. 124 If a duty to act is imposed upon the Al entity,
and it fails to act, the actus reus requirement of the specific offense is
fulfilled by way of an omission.1
25
Attributing the internal element of offenses to Al entities is the real
legal challenge in most cases. Attributing the mental element differs
from one Al technology to the other.126 Most cognitive capabilities
developed in modem Al technology are immaterial to the question of the
imposition of criminal liability. Creativity is a human feature that some
animals possess, but creativity is a not a requirement for imposing
criminal liability. 27 Even the least creative persons are held criminally
liable. The only mental requirements needed in order to impose criminal
liability are knowledge, intent, negligence, etc., as required in the
specific offense and under the general theory of criminal law.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 979-80.
121. Id.




126. PADHY, supra note 6, at 14.
127. DRESSLER, supra note 54, at 126.
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Knowledge is defined as sensory reception of factual data and the
understanding of that data.12 8  Most Al systems are well-equipped for
such reception. 29 Sensory receptors of sights, voices, physical contact,
touch, etc., are common in most Al systems. 130 These receptors transfer
the factual data received to central processing units that analyze the
data.'13  The process of analysis in Al systems parallels that of human
understanding. 132  The human brain understands the data received by
eyes, ears, hands, etc., by analyzing that data. Advanced AI algorithms
are trying to imitate human cognitive processes. 133 These processes are
not so different.
13 4
Specific intent is the strongest of the internal element
requirements. 135 Specific intent is the existence of a purpose or an aim
that a factual event will occur. The specific intent required to establish
liability for murder is a purpose or an aim that a certain person will
128. WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 221 (1890); HERMANN VON
HELMHOLTZ, THE FACTS OF PERCEPTION (1878). In this context knowledge and awareness are
identical. See, e.g., United States v. Youts, 229 F.3d 1312, 1317 (10th Cir. 2000); State v. Sargent,
594 A.2d 401 (Vt. 1991); United States v. Spinney, 65 F.3d 231, 235 (1st Cir. 1995); State v. Wyatt,
482 S.E.2d 147 (W. Va. 1996); United States v. Wert-Ruiz, 228 F.3d 250, 255 (3rd Cir. 2000);
United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700-01 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Ladish Malting Co.,
135 F.3d 484, 488 (7th Cir. 1998). The Model Penal Code even provides that: "A person acts
knowingly with a respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if..., he is aware that his
conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and (ii) if..., he is aware that it is
practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b)
(emphasis added).
129. PADHY, supra note 6, at 10.
130. Margaret A. Boden, Has A! Helped Psychology?, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE 108-11 (Derek Partridge & Yorick Wilks eds., 2006); Derek Partridge, What's in an
Al Program?, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 112-118 (Derek Partridge &
Yorick Wilks eds., 2006); David Mart, AI: A Personal View, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE 97-101 (Derek Partridge & Yorick WilkS eds., 2006).
131. Id.
132. Boden, supra note 130, at 111; Partridge, supra note 130, at 118; Marr, supra note 130, at
101.
133. See supra Part L
134. Daniel C. Dennett, Evolution, Error, and Intentionality, THE FOUNDATIONS OF
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 190 (Derek Partridge & Yorick Wilks eds., 2006); B. Chandraswkaran,
What Kind of Information Processing Is Intelligence?, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE 14 (Derek Partridge & Yorick Wilks eds., 2006).
135. Robert Batey, Judicial Exploration of Mens Rea Confusion at Common Law and Under
the Model Penal Code, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 341, 380-414 (2001); State v. Daniels, 109 So.2d 896,
899 (La. 1958); Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 268 (2000); United States v. Randolph, 93
F.3d 656, 661 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Torres, 977 F.2d 321, 326 (7th Cir. 1992); Frey v.
United States, 708 So.2d 918, 919 (Fla. 1998); State v. Neuzil, 589 N.W.2d 708, 711 (Iowa 1999);
People v. Disimone, 650 N.W.2d 436, 439 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002); People v. Henry, 607 N.W.2d
767, 769 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
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die. 136 As a result of the existence of such intent, the perpetrator of the
offense commits the offense; i.e., he performs the external element of the
specific offense.'37 This situation is not unique to humans. An Al entity
might be programmed to have a purpose or an aim and to take actions in
order to achieve that purpose. This is specific intent.
One might assert that humans have feelings that cannot be imitated
by Al software, not even by the most advanced software. "38 Such
feelings are love, affection, hatred, and jealousy, among others.'39 That
might be correct in relation to the technology of the beginning of the
twenty-first century. However, such feelings are rarely required in
specific offenses. Most specific offenses are satisfied by knowledge of
the existence of the external element. 40  Few offenses require specific
intent in addition to knowledge. Almost all other offenses are satisfied
by much lower standards of culpability. In very few specific offenses
that do require certain feelings (e.g., crimes of racism, hate1 4 '), criminal
liability cannot be imposed upon Al entities, which have no such
feelings, but in any other specific offense, it is not a barrier.
If a person fulfills the requirements of both the external element
and the internal element of a specific offense, then the person is held
criminally liable. 142 Why should an Al entity that fulfills all elements of
an offense be exempt from criminal liability? One might argue that
some segments of human society are exempt from criminal liability even
if both the external and internal elements have been established. 43 Such
segments of society are infants and the mentally ill.' 44 A specific order
136. For the Intent-to-Kill murder, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 733-34 (4th ed.
2003).
137. Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 268 (2000); United States v. Randolph, 93 F.3d
656, 661 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Torres, 977 F.2d 321, 326 (7th Cir. 1992).
138. David Levy, The Ethical Treatment of Artificially Conscious Robots, I INT'L J. SOC.
ROBOTICS. 215 (2009).
139. Id.
140. DRESSLER, supra note 54, at 157.
141. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Boyd, Richard A. Berk & Karl M. Hammer, "Motivated by Hatred
or Prejudice": Categorization of Hate-Motivated Crimes in Two Police Divisions, 30 LAW &
SOC'Y REV. 819 (1996); Projects, Crimes Motivated by Hatred: The Constitutionality and Impact of
Hate Crimes Legislation in the United States, I SYRACUSE J. LEGIS. & POL'Y 29 (1995).
142. DRESSLER, supra note 54, at 126.
143. Heilman v. Commonwealth, 84 Ky. 457, 458 (1886); In re Devon T., 85 Md. App. 674,
684 (1991).
144. The Federal Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2009).
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, at the time of
the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe
mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality of the
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in criminal law exempts infants from criminal liability.145 The social
rationale behind the infancy defense is to protect infants from the
harmful consequences of the criminal process and to handle them in
other social frameworks. 146 Do such frameworks exist for Al entities?
The original legal rationale behind the infancy defense was the fact that
infants are incapable of comprehending what was wrong in their conduct
(dol incapax).14 7  Later, children can be held criminally liable if the
presumption of mental incapacity was refuted by proof that the child was
able to distinguish between right and wrong. 148 Could that be similarly
applied to Al entities? Most Al algorithms are capable of analyzing
permitted and forbidden.
149
The mentally ill are presumed to lack the fault element of the
specific offense, due to their mental illness (doli incapax).5° The
mentally ill are unable to distinguish between right and wrong (cognitive
Id
145. See, e.g,. MINN. STAT. §9913 (1927); MONT. REV. CODE §10729 (1935); N.Y. PENAL
CODE §816 (1935); OKLA. STAT. § 152 (1937); UTAH REV. STAT. 103-1-40 (1933); State v. George,
54 A. 745 (Del. 1902); Heilman v. Commonwealth, 1 S.W. 731 (Ky. 1886); State v. Aaron, 4 N.J.L.
269, 276-77 (1818); McCormack v. State, 15 So. 438, 440 (Ala. 1894); Little v. State, 554 S.W.2d
312 (Ark. 1977); Clay v. State, 196 So. 462, 463 (Fla. 1940); In re Devon T., 584 A.2d 1287 (Md.
Ct. App. 1991); State v. Dillon, 471 P.2d 553 (Idaho 1970); State v. Jackson, 142 S.W.2d 45, 50
(Mo. 1940).
146. Frederick J. Ludwig, Rationale of Responsibility for Young Offenders, 29 NEB. L. REV.
521 (1950); In re Tyvonne, 558 A.2d 661, 666 (Conn. 1989); Andrew Walkover, The Infancy
Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 503 (1984); Keith Foren, Casenote: In Re
Tyvonne M. Revisited: The Criminal Infancy Defense in Connecticut, 18 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 733,
735 (1999); Michael Tonry, Rethinking Unthinkable Punishment Policies in America, 46 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 1751, 1759 (1999); Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing Young Offenders, PRINCIPLED
SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY 294 (Andrew von Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth &
Julian Roberts eds., 3rd ed. 2009); Franklin E. Zimring, Rationales for Distinctive Penal Policies for
Youth Offenders, PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY 316 (Andrew von
Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth & Julian Roberts eds., 3rd ed. 2009); Andrew von Hirsch, Reduced
Penalties for Juveniles: The Normative Dimension, PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON
THEORY AND POLICY 323 (Andrew von Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth & Julian Roberts eds., 3rd ed.
2009).
147. SIR EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTIONS OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND - THIRD PART 4 (6th ed.,
1681, 1817, 2001).
148. MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE 23, 26 (1736) [MATTHEW HALE,
HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1736)]; McCormack v. State, 15 So. 438, 440 (Ala. 1894);
Little v. State, 554 S.W.2d 312, 320 (Ark. 1977); In re Devon T., 584 A.2d 1287, 1296 (Md. Ct.
App. 1991).
149. Tang Howe Hing & Musa Mailah, Simulator for Control of Autonomous Nonholonomic
Wheeled Robot, 8 J. OF APPLIED SCI. 2534, 2536 (2008).
150. See, e.g., Benjamin B. Sendor, Crime as Communication: An Interpretive Theory of the
Insanity Defense and the Mental Elements of Crime, 74 GEO. L.J. 1371, 1380 (1986); Joseph H.
Rodriguez, Laura M. LeWinn & Michael L. Perlin, The Insanity Defense Under Siege: Legislative
Assaults and Legal Rejoinders, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 397, 406-07 (1983); Homer D. Crotty, The History
of Insanity as a Defence to Crime in English Common Law, 12 CAL. L. REV. 105 (1924).
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capabilities)' 51 and to control impulsive behavior. 52  When an Al
algorithm functions properly, there is no reason for it not to use all of its
capabilities to analyze the factual data received through its receptors. 153
However, an interesting legal question would be whether a defense of
insanity might be raised in relation to a malfunctioning Al algorithm,
when its analytical capabilities become corrupted as a result of that
malfunction.
When an Al entity establishes all elements of a specific offense,
both external and internal, there is no reason to prevent imposition of
criminal liability upon it for that offense. 5 4 The criminal liability of an
Al entity does not replace the criminal liability of the programmers or
the users, if criminal liability is imposed on the programmers and/or
users by any other legal path. Criminal liability is not to be divided, but
rather, combined. The criminal liability of the Al entity is imposed in
addition to the criminal liability of the human programmer or user.
However, the criminal liability of an Al entity is not dependent
155
upon the criminal liability of the programmer or user of that Al entity.
As a result, if the specific Al entity was programmed or used by another
Al entity, the criminal liability of the programmed or used Al entity is
not influenced by that fact. 5 6 The programmed or used Al entity shall
be held criminally accountable for the specific offense pursuant to the
direct liability model, unless it was an innocent agent. 57 In addition, the
programmer or user of the Al entity shall be held criminally accountable
for that very offense pursuant to one of the three liability models,
according to its specific role in the offense. 158 The chain of criminal
liability might continue, if more parties are involved, whether human or
Al entities.
There is no reason to eliminate the criminal liability of an Al entity
or of a human, which is based on complicity between them. An Al
151. See, e.g., Edward de Grazia, The Distinction of Being Mad, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 339
(1955); Warren P. Hill, The Psychological Realism of Thurman Arnold, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 377
(1955); Manfred S. Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 325
(1955); Wilber G. Katz, Law, Psychiatry, and Free Will, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 397 (1955); Jerome
Hall, Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility, 65 YALE L. J. 761 (1956).
152. See, e.g., John Barker Waite, Irresistible Impulse and Criminal Liability, 23 MICH. L.
REV. 443, 454 (1925); Edward D. Hoedemaker, "Irresistible Impulse" as a Defense in Criminal
Law, 23 WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (1948).
153. PADHY, supra note 6, at 10.
154. DRESSLER, supra note 24, at 126.
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entity and a human might cooperate as joint perpetrators, as accessories
and abettors, etc., and the relevant criminal liability might be imposed on
them accordingly. Since the factual and mental capabilities of an Al
entity are sufficient to impose criminal liability on it, if these capabilities
satisfy the legal requirements of joint perpetrators, accessories, and
abettors, etc., then the relevant criminal liability as joint perpetrators,
accessories, and abettors, etc., should be imposed, regardless of whether
the offender is an Al entity or a human.
Not only positive factual and mental elements might be attributed
to Al entities. All relevant negative fault elements are attributable to Al
entities.' 59 Most of these elements are expressed by the general defenses
in criminal law (e.g., self-defense, necessity, duress, intoxication,
etc.). 160  For some of these defenses (justifications), 161 there is no
material difference between humans and Al entities, since they relate to
a specific situation (in rem), regardless of the identity of the offender.
For example, an AI entity serving under the local police force is given an
order to arrest a person illegally. If the order is not manifestly illegal,
the executer of the order is not criminally liable.1 62 In that case, there is
no difference whether the executer is human or an Al entity.
For other defenses (excuses and exemptions) 163 some applications
should be adjusted. For example, the intoxication defense is applied
when the offender is under the physical influence of an intoxicating
substance (e.g., alcohol, drugs).' 64 The influence of alcohol on an Al
entity is minor, at most, but the influence of an electronic virus that is
159. Clark & Marshall, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES 467 (1967), Nelson v. State, 597
P.2d 977, 978 (1979). United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 693 (1984), Commonwealth
v. Graves, 461 Pa. 118, 123 (1975).
160. Id.
161. JOHN C. SMITH, JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE IN THE CRIMINAL LAW (1989); Anthony M.
Dillof, Unraveling Unknowing Justification, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1547 (2002); Kent
Greenawalt, Distinguishing Justifications from Excuses, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (1986);
Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 949
(1984); Thomas Morawetz, Reconstructing the Criminal Defenses: The Significance of Justification,
77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 277 (1986); Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal
Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 266 (1975); Paul H. Robinson,
Testing Competing Theories of Justification, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1095 (1998).
162. Michael A. Musmanno, Are Subordinate Officials Penally Responsible for Obeying
Superior Orders Which Direct Commission of Crime?, 67 DICK. L. REV. 221 (1963).
163. Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship between
Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1511 (1992); Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing
Crime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 257 (1987); Andrew E. Lelling, A Psychological Critique of Character-
Based Theories of Criminal Excuse, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 35 (1998).
164. Commonwealth v. Graves, 461 Pa. 118, 123 (1975).
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infecting the operating system of the Al entity might be considered
parallel to the influence of intoxicating substances on humans. Some
other factors might be considered as being parallel to insanity, loss of
control, etc.
165
It might be summed up that the criminal liability of an Al entity
according to the direct liability model is not different from the relevant
criminal liability of a human. In some cases, some adjustments are
necessary, but substantively, it is the very same criminal liability, which
is based upon the same elements and examined in the same ways.
E. Coordination of the Three Liability Models
The three liability models described above are not alternative
models. These models might be applied in combination in order to
create a full image of criminal liability in the specific context of Al
entity involvement. None of the three models is mutually exclusive.
Thus, applying the second model is possible as a single model for the
specific offense, and it is possible as one part of a combination of two of
the legal models or of all three of them.
When the Al entity plays the role of an innocent agent in the
perpetration of a specific offense, and the programmer is the only person
who directed that perpetration, the application of the perpetration-via-
another model (the first liability model) is the most appropriate legal
model for that situation. 66 In that same situation, when the programmer
is itself an Al entity (when an AI entity programs another Al entity to
commit a specific offense), the direct liability model (the third liability
model) is most appropriately applied to the criminal liability of the
programmer of the Al entity.' 67  The third liability model in that
situation is applied in addition to the first liability model, and not in lieu
thereof. Thus, in such situations, the Al entity programmer shall be
criminally liable, pursuant to a combination of the perpetration-via-
another liability model and the direct liability model.
If the Al entity plays the role of the physical perpetrator of the
specific offense, but that very offense was not planned, then the
application of the natural-probable-consequence liability model might be
appropriate. 68  The programmer might be deemed negligent if no
offense had been perpetrated intentionally, or the programmer might be
165. Dressier, supra note 54, at 616-22 (2007).
166. See supra Part III.B.
167. See supra Part III.D.
168. See supra Part II.C.
2010]
23
Hallevy: The Criminal Liability of Artificial Intelligence Entities
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2010
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL
held fully accountable for that specific offense if another offense had
indeed been deliberately planned, but the specific offense that was
perpetrated had not been part of the original criminal scheme.'
69
Nevertheless, when the programmer is not human, the direct liability
model must be applied in addition to the simultaneous application of the
natural-probable-consequence liability model; likewise, when the
physical perpetrator is human and the planner is an Al entity.
The coordination of all three liability models creates an opaque net
of criminal liability. 70  The combined and coordinated application of
these three models reveals a new legal situation in the specific context of
Al entities and criminal law. 1 71 As a result, when Al entities and
humans are involved, directly or indirectly, in the perpetration of a
specific offense, it will be far more difficult to evade criminal liability.
The social benefit derived from such a legal policy is of substantial
value. All entities, human, legal, or Al become subject to criminal
law. 172 If the clearest purpose of the imposition of criminal liability is
the application of legal social control in the specific society, then the
coordinated application of all three models is necessary in the very
context of Al entities.1
73
IV. GENERAL PUNISHMENT ADJUSTMENT CONSIDERATIONS
Let us assume an Al entity is criminally liable. Let us assume it is
indicted, tried, and convicted. After the conviction, the court is
supposed to sentence that Al entity. If the most appropriate punishment
under the specific circumstances is one year of incarceration, for
example, how can an Al entity practically serve such a sentence? How
can capital punishment, probation, or even a fine be imposed on an Al
entity? In instances where there is no body to arrest (especially in cases
of Al software that was not installed in a physical body, such as a robot),
what is the practical meaning of incarceration? Where no bank account
is available for the sentenced Al entity, what is the practical significance
of fining it? Similar legal problems have been raised when the criminal
liability of corporations was recognized. 74 Some asked how any of the
169. Id.




174. Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 23 (1997); Richard Gruner, To Let the Punishment Fit the Organization:
Sanctioning Corporate Offenders Through Corporate Probation, 16 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1988);
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legitimate penalties imposed upon humans could be applicable to
corporations. 175 The answer was simple and legally applicable. When a
punishment can be imposed on a corporation as it is on humans, it is
imposed without change.176  When the court adjudicates a fine, the
corporation pays the fine in the same way that a human pays the fine and
in the same way that a corporation pays its bills in a civil context.
177
However, when punishment of a corporation cannot be carried out in the
same manner as with humans, an adjustment is required. 178 Such is the
legal situation vis-A-vis Al entities.
The punishment adjustment considerations examine the theoretical
foundations of any applied punishment. These considerations are
applied in a similar manner and are comprised of three stages. Each
stage may be explained by a question, as described below:
(1) What is the fundamental significance of the specific
punishment for a human?
(2) How does that punishment affect Al entities?
(3) What practical punishments may achieve the same
significance when imposed on Al entities?
The most significant advantage of these punishment adjustment
considerations is that the significance of the specific punishment remains
identical when imposed on humans and Al entities. This method of
punishment adjustment considerations is referred to below in some of
the punishments used in modem societies: capital punishment,
incarceration, suspended sentencing, community service, and fines.
Capital punishment is considered the most severe punishment for
humans, and there is no consensus regarding its constitutionality among
the various jurisdictions. 7 9 Capital punishment is the most effective
Steven Walt & William S. Laufer, Why Personhood Doesn 't Matter: Corporate Criminal Liability
and Sanctions, 18 Am. J. CRIM. L. 263 (1991); Coffee, supra note 20, at 386; STEVEN Box, POWER,
CRIME AND MYSTIFICATION 16-79 (1983); Fisse & Braithwaite, supra note 21, at 468.
175. Fisse & Braithwaite, supra note 21, at 468.
176. See, e.g., John O'Reilly, Day Pitney LLP, Criminal Liability of Companies Survey,
http://www.lexmundi.com/images/lexmundi/PDF/BusinessCrimes/CrimLiabilityUSA-
New'/o20Jersey.pdf (last visited May 19, 2010).
177. Id.
178. Coffee, supra note 20, at 424-34..
179. See. e.g., the abolition of capital penalty in Germany in 1949, Grundgesetz, Art. 102; in
Britain for murder in 1965, Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act, 1965, c.71; and the debate in
the United States, In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Provenzano v. Moore, 744 So.2d 413 (Fla.
1999); Dutton v. State, 91 A. 417 (Md. 1914); Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 1994);
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878); People v. Daugherty, 256 P.2d 911 (Cal. 1953); Gray v.
Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1983); Hunt v. Nuth, 57 F.3d 1327 (4th Cir. 1995); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1979).
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method of incapacitating offenders as it relates to recidivism since once
the death sentence is carried out, the offender is obviously incapable of
committing any further offense. The significance of capital punishment
for humans is the deprivation of life.' 80 The "life" of an Al entity is its
independent existence as an entity. Sometimes, it has a physical
appearance (e.g., as a robot); sometimes it has only an abstract existence
(e.g., as software installed on a computer system or on a network server).
Considering capital punishment's efficacy in incapacitating
offenders, the practical action that may achieve the same results as
capital punishment when imposed on an Al entity is deletion of the Al
software controlling the Al entity. Once the deletion sentence is carried
out, the offending Al entity is incapable of committing any further
offenses. The deletion eradicates the independent existence of the Al
entity and is tantamount to the death penalty.
Incarceration is one of the most popular sentences imposed in
Western legal systems for serious crimes. 81  The significance of
incarceration for humans is the deprivation of human liberty and the
imposition of severe limitations on human free behavior, freedom of
movement, and freedom to manage one's personal life. 182 The "liberty"
or "freedom" of an Al entity includes the freedom to act as an Al entity
180. ROBERT M. BOHM, DEATHQUEST: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 74-78 (1999); Austin Sarat, The Cultural Life of
Capital Punishment: Responsibility and Representation in Dead Man Walking and Last Dance, THE
KILLING STATE - CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 226 (Austin Sarat ed.,
1999); Peter Fitzpatrick, "Always More to Do": Capital Punishment and the (De)Composition of
Law, THE KILLING STATE - CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 117 (Austin
Sarat ed., 1999); Franklin E. Zimring, The Executioner's Dissonant Song: On Capital Punishment
and American Legal Values, THE KILLING STATE - CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW, POLITICS, AND
CULTURE 137 (Austin Sarat ed., 1999); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Selling a Quick Fix for Boot Hill:
The Myth of.Justice Delayed in Death Cases, THE KILLING STATE - CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW,
POLITICS, AND CULTURE 148 (Austin Sarat ed., 1999).
181. DRESSLER, supra note 54, at 30.
182. David J. Rothman, For the Good of All: The Progressive Tradition in Prison Reform,
HISTORY AND CRIME 271 (James A. Inciardi & Charles E. Faupel eds., 1980); MICHAEL WELCH,
IRONIES OF IMPRISONMENT (2004); Roy D. King, The Rise and Rise of Supermax: An American
Solution in Search of a Problem?, I PUNISHMENT AND SOC'Y 163 (1999); CHASE RIVELAND,
SUPERMAX PRISONS: OVERVIEW AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS (1999); JAMIE FELLNER &
JOANNE MARINER, COLD STORAGE: SUPER-MAXIMUM SECURITY CONFINEMENT IN INDIANA
(1997); Richard Kom, The Effects of Confinement in the High Security Unit in Lexington, 15 SOC.
JUST. 8 (1988); Holly A. Miller, Reexamining Psychological Distress in the Current Conditions of
Segregation, 1 J. CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE 39 (1994); FRIEDA BERNSTEIN, THE PERCEPTION
OF CHARACTERISTICS OF TOTAL INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR EFFECT ON SOCIALIZATION (1979);
BRUNO BETiTELHEIM, THE INFORMED HEART: AUTONOMY IN A MASS AGE (1960); Marek M.
Kaminski, Games Prisoners Play: Allocation of Social Roles in a Total Institution, 15
RATIONALITY AND SOC'Y 188 (2003); JOHN IRWIN, PRISONS IN TURMOIL (1980); ANTHONY J.
MANOCCHIO & JIMMY DUNN, THE TIME GAME: TWO VIEWS OF A PRISON (1982).
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in the relevant area. For example, an Al entity in medical service has the
freedom to participate in surgeries; an Al entity in a factory has the
freedom to manufacture, etc.
Considering the nature of a sentence of incarceration, the practical
action that may achieve the same effects as incarceration when imposed
on an Al entity is to put the Al entity out of use for a determinate period.
During that period, no action relating to the Al entity's freedom is
allowed, and thus its freedom or liberty is restricted.
Suspended sentencing is a very popular intermediate sanction in
Western legal systems for increasing the deterrent effect on offenders in
lieu of actual incarceration. The significance of a suspended sentence for
humans is the very threat of incarceration if the human commits a
specific offense or a type of specific offense.1 3 If the human commits
such an offense, a sentence of incarceration will be imposed for the first
offense in addition to the sentencing for the second offense. As a result,
humans are deterred from committing another offense and from
becoming a recidivist offender. 184 Practically, a suspended sentence is
imposed only in the legal records. No physical action is taken when a
suspended sentence is imposed. As a result, when imposing a suspended
sentence, there is no difference in effect between humans and AI
entities. The statutory criminal records of the state do not differentiate
between a suspended sentence imposed on humans, and those imposed
on corporations or Al entities, as long as the relevant entity may be
identified specifically and accurately.
Community service is also a very popular intermediate sanction in
Western legal systems in lieu of actual incarceration. 8 5 In most legal
systems, community service is a substitute for short sentences of actual
incarceration. 186  In some legal systems, community service is imposed
and coupled with probation so that the offender "pays a price" for the
damages he caused by committing the specific offense. 187  The
183. MARC ANCEL, SUSPENDED SENTENCE (1971); Marc Ancel, The System of Conditional
Sentence or Sursis, 80 L. Q. REV. 334 (1964); Anthony E. Bottoms, The Suspended Sentence in
England 1967-1978, 21 BRITISH J. CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1981).
184. See Ross v. State, 268 Ark. 189, 191 (1980).
185. 188 Malcolm Feeley, Richard Berk & Alec Campbell, Between Two Extremes: An
Examination of the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Community Service Orders and Their
Implications for the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 155,(1992).
186. Id.
187. John Harding, The Development of the Community Service, ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES
FOR COPING WITH CRIME 164 (Norman Tutt ed., 1978); HOME OFFICE, REVIEW OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE POLICY (1977); Ashlee Willis, Community Service as an Alternative to Imprisonment: A
Cautionary View, 24 PROBATION J. 120 (1977); Julie Leibrich, Burt Galaway & Yvonne Underhill,
Community Sentencing in New Zealand: A Survey of Users, 50 FED. PROBATION 55 (1986); James
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significance of community service for humans is compulsory
contribution of labor to the community. 88 As discussed above,' 89 an Al
entity can be engaged as a worker in very many areas.' 90
When an Al entity works in a factory, its work is done for the
benefit of the factory owners or for the benefit of the other workers in
order to ease and facilitate their professional tasks.' 9I In the same way
that an Al entity works for the benefit of private individuals, it may work
for the benefit of the community. When work for the benefit of the
community is imposed on an Al entity as a compulsory contribution of
labor to the community, it may be considered community service.' 9 2
Thus, the significance of community service is identical, whether
imposed on humans or Al entities.
The adjudication of a fine is the most popular intermediate sanction
in Western legal systems in lieu of actual incarceration.1 93  The
significance of paying a fine for humans is deprivation of some of their
property, whether the property is money (a fine) or other property
(forfeiture). 194  When a person fails to pay a fine, or has insufficient
property to pay the fine, substitute penalties are imposed on the offender,
particularly incarceration.' 95 The imposition of a fine on a corporation is
identical to the imposition of a fine on a person, because both people and
corporations have property and bank accounts, so the payment of a fine
is identical, whether the paying entity is human or a corporate entity.
9 6
Austin and Barry Krisberg, The Unmet Promise ofAlternatives, 28 J. OF RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 374
(1982); Mark S. Umbreit, Community Service Sentencing: Jail Alternatives or Added Sanction?, 45
FED. PROBATION 3 (1981).
188. U.S. Courts: The Federal Judiciary, Community Service, http://www.uscourts.gov/
fedprob/supervise/community.htmnl (last visited May 19, 2010).
189. See paragraphs I, II.
190. Boucq, supra note 4.
191. Id.
192. See supra note 190.
193. See Feeley, Berk & Campbell supra note 188.
194. GERHARDT GREBING, THE FINE IN COMPARATIVE LAW: A SURVEY OF 21 COUNTRIES
(1982); Judith A. Greene, Structuring Criminal Fines: Making an 'Intermediate Penalty' More
Useful and Equitable, 13 JUSTICE SYSTEM JOURNAL 37 (1988); NIGEL WALKER & NICOLA
PADFIELD, SENTENCING: THEORY, LAW AND PRACTICE (1996); Manfred Zuleeg, Criminal
Sanctions to Be Imposed on Individuals as Enforcement Instruments in European Competition Law,
EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2001: EFFECTIVE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF EC
ANTITRUST LAW 451 (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Isabela Atanasiu eds., 2001); STEVE UGLOW,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1995); DOUGLAS C. MCDONALD, JUDITH A. GREENE & CHARLES WORZELLA,
DAY-FINES IN AMERICAN COURTS: THE STATEN-ISLAND AND MILWAUKEE EXPERIMENTS (1992).
195. FIORI RINALDI, IMPRISONMENT FOR NON-PAYMENT OF FINES (1976); Use of Short
Sentences of Imprisonment by the Court, REPORT OF THE SCOTTISH ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE
TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS (1960).
196. Fisse & Braithwaite, supra note 21, at 468.
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However, most Al entities have no money, property, or bank accounts of
their own. If an Al entity does have its own property or money, the
imposition of a fine on it would be identical to the imposition of a fine
on humans or corporations.
197
For most humans and corporations, property is gained through
labor. 198 When paying a fine, the property, which is a result of labor, is
transferred to the state. 99 That labor might be transferred to the state in
the form of property or directly as labor. As a result, a fine imposed on
an Al entity might be collected as money or property and as labor for the
benefit of the community.200 When the fine is collected in the form of
labor for the benefit of the community, it is not different from
community service as described above.20 1
202Thus, most common punishments are applicable to Al entities.
The imposition of specific penalties on Al entities does not negate the
nature of these penalties in comparison with their imposition on humans.
Of course, some general punishment adjustment considerations are
necessary in order to apply these penalties, but still, the nature of these
penalties remains the same relative to humans and to Al entities.
V. CONCLUSION
If all of its specific requirements are met, criminal liability may be
201imposed upon any entity-human, corporate, or Al entity. Modem
times warrant modem legal measures in order to resolve today's legal
problems.
The rapid development of Artificial Intelligence technology
requires current legal solutions in order to protect society from possible
dangers inherent in technologies not subject to the law, especially
criminal law.2 °4 Criminal law has a very important social function, to
preserve social order for the benefit and welfare of society.205 The
threats upon that social order may be posed by humans, corporations, or
Al entities.20 6 Traditionally, humans have been subject to criminal law,
197. O'Reilly, supra note 176.
198. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 42 (1689).




203. See supra Parts III, IV
204. See Weng, Chen & Sun, supra note 1, at 273.
205. Williams, supra note 16, at 2181.
206. See supra Parts Ill, IV.
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207
except when otherwise decided by international consensus. Thus,
minors and mentally ill persons are not subject to criminal law in most
legal systems around the world. Although corporations in their modem
form have existed since the fourteenth century,20 8 it took hundreds of
years to subordinate corporations to the law, and especially, to criminal
law. 20 9  For hundreds of years, the law stated that corporations are not
subject to criminal law, as inspired by Roman law (societas delinquere
non potest).210
It was only in 1635 that an English court dared to impose criminal
21122liability on a corporation. It was inevitable.2 2  Corporations
participate fully in human life, and it was outrageous not to subject them
to human laws, since offenses are committed by corporations or through
them. 213 But corporations have neither body nor soul. 214 Legal solutions
were developed so that in relation to criminal liability, they would be
deemed capable of fulfilling all requirements of criminal liability,
including external elements and internal elements. 215  These solutions
were embodied in models of criminal liability and general punishment
216
adjustment considerations.
It worked. In fact, it is still working, and very successfully. Why
should Al entities be different from corporations? Al entities are taking
larger and larger parts in human activities, as do corporations.217
Offenses have already been committed by Al entities or through them.218
Al entities have no soul, and some Al entities have neither body nor
207. John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Killing the Non-Willing: Atkins, the Volitionally
Incapacitated, and the Death Penalty, 55 S.C. L. REV. 93, 122-25,
208. WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 471-76 (1923).
209. Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liability, 82 IND.
L.J. 411,419 (2007); Coffee, supra note 20, at 386.
210. William Searle Holdsworth, English Corporation Law in the 16th and 17th Centuries, 31
YALE L.J. 382 (1922); WILLIAM ROBERT SCoTrT, THE CONSTITUTION AND FINANCE OF ENGLISH,
SCOTISH AND IRISH JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES TO 1720 462 (1912); BISHOP CARLETON HUNT, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN ENGLAND 1800-1867 6 (1963).
211. Langforth Bridge, (1635) Cro. Car. 365, 79 E.R. 919; See in addition Clifton
(Inhabitants), (1794) 5 T.R. 498, 101 E.R. 280; Great Broughton (Inhabitants), (1771) 5 Burr.
2700, 98 E.R. 418; Stratford-upon-Avon Corporation, (1811) 14 East 348, 104 E.R. 636; Liverpool
(Mayor), (1802) 3 East 82, 102 E.R. 529; Saintiff, (1705) 6 Mod. 255, 87 E.R. 1002;. Weissman &
Newman, supra note 211, at 419.
212. Coffee, supra note 20, at 386.
213. O'Reilly, supra note 176.
214. Coffee, supra note 20, at 386.
215. Frederick Pollock, Has the Common Law Received the Fiction Theory of Corporations?,
27 L. Q. REV. 219 (1911).
216. O'Reilly, supra note 176; Coffee, supra note 20, at 424-34.
217. Weng, Chen & Sun, supra note 1, at 267; Boucq, supra note 5.
218. Weng, Chen & Sun, supra note 1, at 273.
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SOUl. 2 19 Thus, there is no substantive legal difference between the idea
of criminal liability imposed on corporations and on Al entities. It
would be outrageous not to subordinate them to human laws, as
corporations have been. Models of criminal liability exist as general
paths to impose punishment. What else is needed?
219. Solum, supra note 69, at 1262.
2010]
31
Hallevy: The Criminal Liability of Artificial Intelligence Entities
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2010
32
Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 4 [2010], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol4/iss2/1
